A World War I Rogues’ Gallery

“Sir Edward Grey. A favorite subject of mine, Sir Edward may be described as a foreign minister who hated foreigners. He did not understand them and couldn’t figure out why they didn’t behave like English gentlemen.” Sanford Rose

Dolors & Sense

By Sanford Rose

KISSIMMEE Florida—(Weekly Hubris)—7/29/2013—And just when I thought Weekly Hubris readers were fed up with my World War I pieces . . . along comes an encouraging reader reaction to my last posting.

So I’ll try a few impressionistic notes on some of the principal actors in the run-up to the war.

Winston Churchill. Yes, he was an actor not just in World War II, but also in the first conflict. A Liberal Imperialist, he plumped for war from his post as First Lord of the Admiralty. Lord Morley, a Cabinet colleague, described him as that “condottiere” who argued for war with “demonic” energy. He is widely believed to have helped persuade Lloyd George, originally a partisan for British non-intervention, to switch sides, although that volte-face may have resulted from the recognition that, if it did not intervene in the war, the Liberal government of which he was a part would have to resign and Lloyd George would therefore lose his post as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Sir Edward Grey. A favorite subject of mine, Sir Edward may be described as a foreign minister who hated foreigners. He did not understand them and couldn’t figure out why they didn’t behave like English gentlemen. It is argued by many that he could have prevented the war had he warned the Germans as late as July 26, two days before Austria declared war on Serbia, that Britain would side with France and Russia if a global conflict ensued. But, as one writer caustically noted, Grey could not warn Germany on July 26 “because he departed for his usual weekend in the country on the afternoon of July 25.”

Kaiser Wilhelm. Erratic and impetuous, though at times marvelously lucid, the German emperor was bellicose when danger was far off, but increasingly pacific as it neared. A close friend of the assassinated archduke, Wilhelm issued the famous blank check on July 5, pledging German support for whatever action Austria took to discipline Serbia. Then, when he read Serbia’s beguiling and superficially acquiescent reply to Austria’s truculent ultimatum later in the month, he avowed that all reason for war had disappeared and proceeded to accept a suggestion from the Russian tsar that he undertake personal mediation with Vienna. But he changed his mind once again after a later and ambiguously phrased telegram from the tsar implied that Russia had been mobilizing for several days before making the request for his mediation.

Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. Of Bethmann-Hollweg, it was said that Germany lost a good schoolmaster when he became its chancellor. Inexperienced in foreign affairs, Bethmann-Hollweg blundered repeatedly throughout the July crisis. He banked on Britain’s neutrality and was genuinely shocked when his hopes were dashed. He famously said when told by the British ambassador in early August that Britain was declaring war because of Germany’s violation of Belgian territory, as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1839: “Would you go to war over a scrap of paper?”

Count Leopold von Berchtold. Austria’s foreign minister was elegant with polished manners but little else, according to Thomas Masaryk, the Czech national hero. Criticized for his failure to take vigorous action against Serbia during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, Berchtold more than compensated during the 1914 crisis. He claimed, however, that Germany was applying inexorable pressure for war, largely through its chief of staff, von Moltke. When the kaiser told Bethmann-Hollweg in late July to rein in the Austrians, Berchtold was genuinely confused, exclaiming: “Who rules in Berlin, Bethmann or Moltke?”

Raymond Poincare. France’s president was a man of formidable ability whose lifelong objective was to retrieve the two provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, which had been annexed by Germany after it defeated France in 1870. Poincare accepted the analysis of his general staff that if Austria attacked Serbia, Germany would lose the ensuing war because, with the Austrian army preoccupied in the Balkans and unable to assist it, the German army facing the Russians in the east would require reinforcements from the west, thereby weakening the German western thrust and enabling the French army, reinforced by the British, to triumph. Of Poincare, it was once said: “He knew everything but understood nothing.”