The Unintended but Inevitable Famine of 2026

Planetary Hospice

By Dr. Guy McPherson

“The first two paragraphs of the story at HR News provide a daunting overview: ‘On March 27, 2026, Stanislav Krapivnik — a former US Army officer, supply chain executive, and military-political analyst now based in Russia — gave his assessment of two converging crises: an attack on a key Russian position on the Baltic coast, and what he describes as a permanent or near-permanent collapse of Gulf energy infrastructure. His conclusion is that these developments, stacked on top of an already-disrupted global fertilizer supply chain, will produce a food crisis by mid-summer 2026 — not as a possibility, but as a predictable consequence of conditions already in place.’”—Dr. Guy McPherson

“We’re entering, by mid- to late summer, if there’s not a ground war already going on, considering everything the European Union is about to be hit with, including starvation, at least in the lower classes, we’re going to be entering a zone of possible nuclear war.”—Stanislav Krapivnik

Editor’s Note: Readers in search of “further context” for Stanislav Krapivnik, the Russia-based analyst referenced in Dr. McPherson’s third paragraph below, should start with these Youtube: “Stanislav Krapivnik: NATO-Russia Escalation—Another Big Step Toward Nuclear War,” and “Is First-Strike Nuclear Attack A US Agenda? Russian Response? Stanislav Krapivnik—AU.” Having listened to many of Krapivnik’s interviews (with various online commentators based in the West), I think his analysis is of interest, with the caveat that listeners keep in mind, as well, his biases, allegiances, and perhaps above all, his position—deep within Putin’s Russia. I do think, however, it is instructive to hear what a military and supply chain specialist (and Putin loyalist, so there’s that) has to say about the war in Iran, and its perhaps unintended plethora of consequences. Little of what we encounter in our current news diet may be said to be “objective,” but the more voices we hear, and the better we are able to weigh their information value, the better prepared we will be to face, if not weather, what is just ahead of us. 

BELLOWS FALLS Vermont—(Hubris)—June 2026—I have mentioned many different means by which we can bring about the extinction of our species. This will almost certainly lead to the loss of all life on Earth because of the rapid rate of environmental change in our wake.

An article at HR News adds another means of extinction for our species. Titled “Experts Warn Global Mass Starvation is Coming By Summer,” the article was published on 28 March 2026. The subhead reads “Lack of Oil, Diesel and Fertilizer As the US War of Aggression on Iran Has No End in Sight.”

The first two paragraphs of the story at HR News provide a daunting overview: “On March 27, 2026, Stanislav Krapivnik — a former US Army officer, supply chain executive, and military-political analyst now based in Russia — gave his assessment of two converging crises: an attack on a key Russian position on the Baltic coast, and what he describes as a permanent or near-permanent collapse of Gulf energy infrastructure.

His conclusion is that these developments, stacked on top of an already-disrupted global fertilizer supply chain, will produce a food crisis by mid-summer 2026 — not as a possibility, but as a predictable consequence of conditions already in place.”

I’d like to add some emphasis to that last phrase: “not as a possibility, but as a predictable consequence of conditions already in place.” As a huge fan of food, seriously opposed to being hungry, this phrase is not welcome.

The next paragraph lends credibility to the source: “Krapivnik has held senior supply chain roles across Eurasia and has direct operational experience with refinery construction and industrial logistics—the exact systems now under stress.”

Beneath a subsection titled “Russia Cuts Fuel Exports at the Start of Planting Season,” we find four explanatory paragraphs: “On March 28, 2026, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced a ban on gasoline exports starting April 1, running through July 31. The reason given: instability in global oil markets caused by the US-Iran conflict is driving significant price volatility, and Russia needs to protect domestic supply. Diesel for non-producers has been under a ban through the same period.

“The timing is direct. Southern European planting season starts in April. Northern European planting runs from May onward.

“Diesel is not optional for industrial-scale farming — it powers every tractor, every plow, every planting rig on large commercial farms. Farms operating hundreds of acres cannot substitute manual labor. Without diesel at the right moment in the planting window, crops don’t go in the ground.

“Russia has historically exported between 120,000 and 170,000 barrels of gasoline per day. That volume is now directed inward. Europe, which has been rebuilding diesel supply chains since the 2022 rupture with Russian energy markets, now faces that disruption again — this time coinciding with a broader energy shock from the Gulf.”

The article continues with a subsection titled “The Fertilizer Supply Chain Has Already Collapsed.”

This subsection includes six paragraphs that further explain the dire situation: “The Strait of Hormuz effectively closed on February 28, 2026, following the start of US-Israeli military operations against Iran. Maritime traffic through the strait fell by 97 percent in the days following the strikes. This is not a shipping delay — it is a physical cutoff.

“The Gulf is the center of gravity for global nitrogen fertilizer production. The region accounts for roughly 46 percent of global urea exports, 25 percent of ammonia trade, and 44 percent of seaborne sulfur supply — sulfur being the essential feedstock for phosphate fertilizers DAP and MAP.

“Qatar’s state fertilizer company QAFCO operates the world’s largest urea production site at 5.6 million metric tons of annual output — approximately 14 percent of global supply. QAFCO went offline on March 4 after QatarEnergy halted LNG production due to the conflict. With no gas feedstock, there is no urea.

“Urea prices in Egypt — the standard bellwether for global nitrogen — rose from $400–490 per ton before the war to approximately $700 by mid-March, a roughly 50 percent increase in under three weeks. Ammonia is up 20–24 percent. These are not futures moves — they reflect the physical absence of product in the market.

“Chris Lawson, VP at commodity analysis firm CRU, put the scope plainly: around 30 percent of exportable fertilizer supply is simply not available right now. Roughly 2.1 million tons of finished urea stockpile cannot be loaded onto vessels — it is sitting in warehouses on the wrong side of the blockade.

“Krapivnik’s supply chain point here is specific: nitrogen fertilizer cannot be stockpiled by farmers across seasons the way potash or phosphate sometimes can. As commodity analyst Dawid Heyl of Ninety One told CNBC: ‘You can skip a season of potash, you can skip a season of phosphates, but you can’t skip a season of nitrogen.’ Without nitrogen applied during the planting window, yield collapses.”

It gets worse. Beneath a subsection titled “Infrastructure Damage and Repair Timelines,” we find verification of bad news: “Krapivnik draws on his direct construction and supply chain experience to make a point that gets lost in standard commodity reporting: specialized industrial infrastructure does not get repaired quickly. Pressure vessels, custom-fabricated steel assemblies, and gas processing equipment are not off-the-shelf items.

“A single refinery segment can take 7–8 months to rebuild. Custom components require dedicated manufacturing runs. Europe does not have the domestic gas supply or the manufacturing scale to substitute for Gulf output.

“QatarEnergy has indicated the damage to Ras Laffan facilities — the world’s largest L[iquid] N[atural] G[as] complex — could take three to five years to fully repair. Even if the Strait reopened tomorrow, that production does not come back online next month.

“The downstream effects are already cascading. India’s IFFCO has begun scaling back urea output because imported L[iquid] N[atural] G[as] feedstock has become prohibitively expensive. Pakistan and Bangladesh have halted fertilizer production entirely. Egypt has lost its gas imports from Israel and is now competing on the L[iquid] N[atural] G[as] spot market at elevated prices. European manufacturer Yara has been forced to scale back production at its Babrala plant in India due to feedstock shortages.

“The 2026 disruption is structurally different from the 2022 Russia-Ukraine fertilizer crisis. In 2022, the shock was primarily cost-driven — gas prices rose, production became expensive, but product could still be rerouted. In 2026, the disruption is physical. There are no pipeline or land alternatives capable of moving bulk ammonia and urea volumes out of the Persian Gulf. The product is either there or it isn’t.”

“Skipping ahead, we find a subsection titled “The Planting Season Timeline.” The initial paragraph verifies that the situation is dire: “The World Economic Forum has noted that the current disruption has hit precisely during planting season in much of the Northern Hemisphere, running from mid-February through early May. In the United States, the mid-April deadline for nitrogen application to corn crops is a hard cutoff. Missing it doesn’t mean a reduced yield — it means the decision about that crop is effectively already made.”

I’m a huge fan of eating. As a result, I could stand to skip a meal or two. However, I am unwilling to make that decision for other people. In addition, there is a significant difference between eating less and not eating at all. I’m not looking forward to the day when the decision is not in my hands.