Were There Any “Goodies”?

“As many have pointed out, it is one of the great tragedies of all wars, and especially of World War I, that every nation can make a plausible argument that it acted in self-defense. And he who acts to defend his country is good. Right?” Sanford Rose

Dolors & Sense

By Sanford Rose

KISSIMMEE Florida—(Weekly Hubris)—8/5/2013—A friend noted that my last posting reviewed the “baddies” of World War I. But, she asked, were there any “goodies”?

Of course. The baddies were also the goodies.

As many have pointed out, it is one of the great tragedies of all wars, and especially of World War I, that every nation can make a plausible argument that it acted in self-defense.

And he who acts to defend his country is good. Right?

Perhaps not, if the case for self-defense is merely plausible, not actual.

So let’s consider the respective cases.

Austria-Hungary alleged that it had to invade Serbia in order to protect the Hapsburg monarchy from dissolution. In one sense, this case is overstated: Serbia envisioned no military assault on Austria. However, the fact that Austria contained so many Southern Slavs, who looked, in some senses, to Serbia for redress of grievances, indeed constituted a threat to that country’s territorial integrity and safety.

Germany alleged that it went to war nominally to support its Austrian ally but really to protect itself from encirclement and eventual domination by the Triple Entente powers of France, Russia and Britain. This case is far-fetched. Germany could have forced Austria to mediate its dispute with Serbia, as it belatedly attempted to do. To be sure, Germany was indeed encircled and might be attacked by France and Russia on both fronts. But had it not meddled in Balkan affairs, encouraging, at least initially, Austria to punish Serbia, that attack, which did in fact take place in 1914, would not have occurred for many years and perhaps not at all.

Russia went to war nominally to defend its Serbian ally but really to protect its Black Sea shipping against the threat that Turkey, allied to Germany and possessed of British-made warships, might close the Straits. This is another far-fetched case. Russia didn’t care a fig about Serbia, whose interests it had ignored and even betrayed in the past. And it viewed war less as means of keeping the Straits open than as an opportunity to seize and occupy both the Straits and Constantinople.

Paradoxically, although Germany invaded France preemptively, the French rationale for war is among the least defensive. France allied with Russia in the hope of seizing an opportunity to beat its traditional German enemy and re-acquire the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.

Britain went to war nominally to support France and Russia (Belgium was a red herring) but really because many, though still only a minority, of its leaders had developed a disproportionate, even pathological, fear of a Germany, whose industrial strength outstripped its own. Yet, absent the encouragement Britain gave to France and Russia, there would have been no war, and Germany would have posed no immediate danger.

So, who among the six baddies discussed in last week’s posting—two English (Churchill and Grey), two German (the Kaiser and his chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg), an Austrian (Berchtold), and a Frenchman (Poincare)—are goodies?

Again, since all believed they were acting in defense of their countries, all were in some sense goodies.

But, based on the criterion of immediacy of the threat, none really qualifies, except perhaps the Austrian Berchtold. Yet, again paradoxically, he represents the country whose aggressive stance toward Serbia following the archduke’s assassination triggered the whole crisis.