C’est Ma Guerre

“So sedulous and successful was his campaign that one opposition Socialist was moved to say: ‘Has France no other glory than to serve the rancors of M. Izvolsky?’.” Sanford Rose

Dolors & Sense

By Sanford Rose

KISSIMMEE Florida—(Weekly Hubris)—6/17/2013—“That’s my war,” exclaimed Alexander Izvolsky, at the outbreak of World War I in August, 1914.

War is not generally something to crow about, but Izvolsky, then serving as Russia’s ambassador to France, viewed the conflict as a personal achievement that he had been scheming to bring about for many years.

In 1908, Izvolsky, then Russia’s foreign minister, thought he had made a crackerjack deal with Baron Aehrenthal, Austria-Hungary’s foreign minister. Russia would not oppose Austria’s annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina if Austria supported opening the Turkish Straits to Russian warships.

The proposed deal, not initially made public, was both incredibly cynical and incredibly naïve.

It was cynical in that it betrayed the interests of Serbians, many of whom lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and wanted the provinces to be incorporated into Serbia, not Austria. Russia had openly championed the interests of Serbs, their Southern Slav brethren. But when Serbian interests conflicted with those of Russia, Russia stood prepared to disregard them.

It was naïve in that it presupposed that the other European powers would go along with Austrian support of Russian access to the Straits. The powers had banned the use of the Straits by warships of any nation since the 1840s, and they were not about to change their attitude, especially since Izvolsky was proposing “exclusive” access for Russian warships.

The wily Baron Aehrenthal grasped the situation. He would give the Russian the “sleeves from his vest,” getting the real “quid” of the annexation while offering the meaningless “quo” of Austrian support for something Izvolsky could not get the other powers to agree to.

Aehrenthal immediately announced the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina while Izvolsky was still traversing Europe in a vain effort to obtain support for the Straits demarche.

The Serbs were furious at Austria, but not being privy to Izvolsky’s proposed betrayal, not at Russia.

The Serbs threatened war and began to mobilize.

Izvolsky, realizing that he had been duped, tried to encourage them. But, of course, his position was hopelessly compromised. And when the Austrians threatened to publish the transcript of the talks between the two foreign ministers, Izvolsky quickly told the Serbs to cool their anger and wait for the day when a stronger and better-armed Russia could assist them.

The war that was to start in 1914 almost happened in the same area five years earlier.

Izvolsky, who was humiliated and subsequently removed as foreign minister when the details of the defunct deal with Aehrenthal began to emerge, vowed revenge against the Austrians.

He quickly fetched up in the Russian embassy in Paris, where he worked tirelessly to strengthen France’s Germanophobia, including alleged bribery of sympathetic French politicians.

So sedulous and successful was his campaign that one opposition Socialist was moved to say: “Has France no other glory than to serve the rancors of M. Izvolsky?”

Apparently, not just France, but also much of the rest of the world, ended up in their service.

The image used to illustrate this essay derives from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M_124_Kitchener_Llyod_Paul_Mantoux_George_Bertie_of_Thame_Asquith_Beyens_de_Broqueville_Bourgeois_Roques_Briand_Lacaze_JOffre_de_Castelnau_Rachitch_Yovanovitch_Vesnitch_Pachitch_Isvolski.JPG.